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SEC FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BROKER-DEALERS:
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED REVISIONS*
JAMES S. "MOFSKYf
The 1960's witnessed a tremendous growth for the securities in-
dustry, estimated to be twenty per cent compounded yearly.' During
that period the volume of securities transactions swelled far more than
had been predicted, and the number of shares outstanding, number of
shareholders and amount of brokerage profits increased dramatically.2
In retrospect, it does not seem surprising that the expansion of the
securities industry during that period would generate its own set of
special problems.' Yet those industry-wide problems either were not
timely recognized or, if recognized, were not dealt with effectively as
they occurred.4 It was not until the market decline of 1966-1970, when
a large number of securities firms were liquidated, merged or ceased
doing business,5 that those problems came into clearer focus for most
non-industry observers. After those involved had failed to take immediate
action to solve their problems,' the securities industry was unable to
* The field of securities regulation is a fast-moving area of the law. Prof. Mofsky's
article was current as of December 1, 1971.
t Associate Professor, University of Miami Law School.
1. See STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESs., REVIEW OF SEC RECORDS
OF THE DEMISE OF SELECTED BROKER DEALERS I (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited
as SEC RECORDS REVIEW]. Portions of the study referred to in the text are reprinted
in BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., July 28, 1971, at E-1 to E-4.
2. See SEC REcoRDs REVIEW, supra note 1.
3. Id. See also note 52 infra and text accompanying.
4. For example, although the New York Stock Exchange established a ten million
dollar trust fund with a fifteen million dollar line of credit for the protection of the
customers of financially troubled members, the trust instruments provided that use of
funds was voluntary, the Exchange vacillated with respect to use of the funds for those
member firms forced into bankruptcy or liquidation and the fund eventually was almost
exhausted. Additionally, there was no similar fund for the protection of investors who
dealt with over-the-counter broker-dealers, and the existing bonding requirements of the
various states or exchanges either were too small to afford adequate protection or were
drafted so that persons other than customers were beneficiaries. For a discussion of
those and other matters, see Sowards & Mofsky, The Securities Investor Protection Act
of i97o, 26 Bus. LAW. 1271 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sowards & Mofsky].
5. During the 1969-70 crisis, a total of 129 New York Stock Exchange member
firms went out of business, merged or were otherwise acquired by other firms. See BNA
SEC. REG. L. REP., Aug. 4, 1971, at A-11.
6. Eventually, the industry did initiate some solutions prior to the enactment of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. See H.R. 18081, H.R. 18109, H.R. 18458, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Barron's, Dec. 28, 1970, at 7, col. 1; Barron's, Dec. 21,
1970, at 3. But they came too late to overcome the strong sentiment favoring govern-
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remedy the situation without government intervention. As the rash of
brokerage failures, forced liquidations and mergers proliferated, the
political pressures for regulatory solutions imposed by government in-
creased. Congress responded by enacting the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act of 1970 and embarking on subcommittee investigations
and studies.'
In the aftermath of brokerage failures, the New York Stock Ex-
change and the Securities and Exchange Commission were severely criti-
cized for their failure to anticipate the problems and to deal with
them effectively as they occurred.' Although there were many reasons
for the brokerage failures during that period, those reasons were often
over-simplified as "capital deficiency.' Thus, the respective provisions
of the Exchange and Commission net capital rules1 that regulate the
capital requirements of broker-dealers came under close scrutiny and
attack. In July 1971 the Exchange responded with broad revisions of its
rule'2 which, although deemed by the Commission to impose more
comprehensive requirements than those of the Commission rule, in
ment intervention that had built up. See Hearings on S. 2348 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78 o, 78aaa-78111 (1970).
8. See, e.g., SEC REcoRDs RFviEw, supra note 1. Section 11(h) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 requires the SEC to make a study of unsafe and un-
sound practices of broker-dealers and report to Congress, within twelve months, the
steps being taken to eliminate those practices. That study and report have not yet been
released.
9. See Hearings on S. 2348 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
10. Although the SEC REcoRDs REVIEW, supra note 1, recognized the problems that
resulted in brokerage failures during 1969-70, it too finally recorded each instance of
brokerage failure as a capital deficiency. See BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., July 28, 1971,
at E-1.
11. NYSE rules 325, 326, 313 and 320. For the revised texts of the Exchange fi-
nancial rules for broker-dealers, see BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., July 21, 1971, at I-1 to 1-9.
The Commission's rule (15c3-1) may be found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 3-1 (1971).
12. Among the more significant revisions of the New York Stock Exchange rule
are: a lowering of the net capital ratio from twenty-to-one to fifteen-to-one; a doubling
of the minimum capital requirement to 100,000 dollars; a limitation on the expansion of
member firms having a net capital ratio in excess of ten-to-one for fifteen consecutive
business days; notification of the Exchange and possible business cutbacks when a firm's
ratio reaches twelve-to-one; restrictions on the withdrawal of firm capital; deduction of
full short security differences more than 44 days old from net capital; and increased
"haircuts" on securities held for capital purposes. For the complete revised text of the
Exchange rules, see BNA SEC. REG. L. RE,., note 1, July 21, 1971, at I-1 to 1-9. Al-
though the practice of carrying subordinated loans as assets but not as liabilities had been
severely criticized during and after the 1969-70 crisis, that practice was not prohibited in
the revised Exchange rules, although there were some limitations placed on withdrawal
(no withdrawal for at least one year and then only on six months' notice). The proposed
changes to the SEC's net capital ratio rule do nothing to alter previous practices in this
connection.
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certain respects actually impose less strigent requirements."8 The Com-
mission has proposed amendments to its net capital rule which, if
adopted, could have far-reaching economic implications that are not
obvious. In addition, the Commission has proposed other rules that
pertain to the financial responsibilities of broker-dealers and that similarly
may have significant, unannounced implications. It is the purpose of this
article to point out those expensive consequences in the hope that the
Commission will carefully weigh those costs against the presumed bene-
fits and not blithely adopt additional regulation solely under the
banner of "investor protection."
At the outset, it is important to recognize the underlying purpose
of the net capital rule. There are actually two parts to the rule, each of
which serves separate and related functions. First, the rule requires that
a broker or dealer's "aggregate indebtedness" be not more than twenty
times his "net capital," as those terms are defined. 4 This aspect of the
rule amounts to a continuous, operational limit on the aggregate indebted-
ness of a broker-dealer that must be met as long as he remains in the
business. If a broker-dealer decides to increase his aggregate indebtedness
by 1,000 dollars, compliance with the rule requires him to increase his
net capital fifty dollars. 5 Second, since 1965 the Commission's rule has
required that brokers and dealers have and maintain a minimum capital
of 5,000 dollars." That requirement serves as a qualification device,
since a broker or dealer cannot be registered with the Commission until
he meets the 5,000 dollar requirement. The requirement serves also as
13. In computing net capital under the SEC rule, there is a requirement that clear-
ing corporation deposits, commissions receivable, securities shipped free and "haircuts"
on net short positions be deducted. However, there is no requirement that amounts for
those matters be deducted in computing net capital under the New York Stock Exchange
rule. For a more detailed analysis of this matter and a computation of net capital under
both SEC and NYSE rules (illustrating the less stringent requirements of the NYSE
in some instances), see BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., Sept. 1, 1971, at A-7 to A-S. SEC rule
15c3-1 (b) (2) exempts NYSE member firms from the Commission net capital rule on
the ground that the Exchange rule and practices are more comprehensive than those of
the Commission.
14. For detailed analysis of those terms, see E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULA-
TION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 57-71 (1965) ; 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1350-55
(2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
15. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 86 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL STUDY RE-
PORT].
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (a) (2) (1970). Under certain circumstances the mini-
mum capital need be only 2,500 dollars. These 2,500 dollar capital requirements are
applicable only to broker-dealers whose transactions are limited to mutual fund shares
and share accounts of insured savings and loan associations, provided such broker-dealers
do not hold funds or securities for customers other than for prompt execution of trans-
actions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (a) (2) (i-iii) (1970).
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a continuous, operational requirement since the minimum capital must
be maintained throughout the course of business. These two aspects of
the rule are related in that the amount of aggregate indebtedness that
may be incurred by a broker-dealer is computed as a multiple of the
broker-dealer's net capital.
Originally, the Commissions's rule was based solely on a ratio
between net capital and aggregate indebtedness. There was no minimum
capital requirement."7 In 1963, the Special Study of Securities Markets,
recommending the institution of a minimum capital requirement,
emphasized its finding of a "disproportionate" number of violations of
Commission rules (not necessarily rules relating to financial require-
ments of broker-dealers) among broker-dealers with small net capital
positions."8 Although the study showed no causal relationship between
those violations and the low net capital of the broker-dealers involved,
it nonetheless offered that evidence as a partial reason for its recommen-
dation.' Additionally, the study offered evidence that broker-dealers
with a net capital less than 5,000 dollars were more likely to violate the
Commission's ratio rule than were securities firms having a greater
capital."0 Those reasons, along with a desire to instill more "confidence"
among members of the financial community and a wish to create greater
"commitment"and ability on the part of broker-dealers to meet their
obligations, resulted in a recommendation that a minimum capital re-
quirement be established as an essential qualification for securities
firms.2 ' The 5,000 dollar minimum capital requirement recommended
by the study was ultimately adopted by the Commission in 1965.22
The question of minimum capital was not significantly raised again
until the brokerage failures of 1969-1970. Although it was readily
admitted that an increase in the minimum capital requirement to any
specific level would not guarantee the success of a securities firm, a
House of Representatives subcommittee staff in July, 1971 recommended
such an increase.2" In addition to advancing the old argument of "more
serious commitment,"2 the staff study also argued that an increse
would provide more protection for funds contributed to the Securities
17. See SEC SPE CIAL STUDY REPORT, supra note 15.
18. Id. at 91.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 161-62.
22. See note 11 supra.
23. See note 1 supra.
24. See SEC SPEcIAL STUvy REPORT, supra note 15, at 161.
INDIANA LA W JO URNAL
Investor Protection Corporation.2" Recommendations were also made
by that same group to substantially reduce the permissible ratio of
aggregate indebtedness to net capital."
Shortly after publication of the subcommittee staff recommendations,
the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed an amendment to
its net capital rule that would impose an initial net capital ratio of
eight-to-one (instead of the usual twenty-to-one ratio) on all brokers for
the first twelve months of their existence and would increase the minimum
capital requirement to 25,000 dollars.2 Thus, the proposed lower ratio
would be applicable only to relatively new brokerage firms. The proposed
increase in minimum capital, while applicable to all firms regardless of
their date of organization, would be imposed with respect to existing
firms on the basis of 15,000 dollar minimum capital not later than six
months after the effective date of the proposal increased to 25,000
dollars within twelve months after the effective date of the amend-
ment.2" New firms would be required to meet the 25,000 dollar standard
immediately upon the amendment's effective date.29
The Commission offered only a short, superficial explanation for
the proposed amendments to the net capital rule. In addition to references
to the 1963 Special Study ° and to the recommendations and findings
of the staff of the House subcommittee, 1 the only rationale offered in
the release proposing the amendments is a general statement that financial
losses by customers, consisting of securities and cash in the possession
of securities firms that have become insolvent, highlight the inadequacy
of the present capital requirements for brokers tand dealers.2 Nowhere
25. For discussion of the function of the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion, see notes 58-68 infra & text accompanying.
26. See note 1 supra.
27. Those persons described in note 16 supra were allowed to continue at the 2,500
dollar requirement level. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9288 (Aug. 13, 1971).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See note 15 supra.
31. See note 1 szpra.
32. The hardships as well as financial losses faced in recent years by cus-
tomers respecting their securities and cash in the possession of broker or dealers
who became insolvent have highlighted the inadequacy of the present capital re-
quirements of brokers and dealers. It is accordingly imperative that increased
net capital requirements be applied to brokers and dealers so that as going
businesses they can meet all of their current obligations to transmit funds and
securities to customers. In this connection, the Commission has recently co-
operated with the New York Stock Exchange in its revision of the Exchange's
net capital rule. One of the changes achieved thereby was to increase minimum
net capital requirements to $100,000 for member firms which carry customer
accounts.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9288 (Aug. 13, 1971).
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does the Commission release refer to the specific evidence upon which it
bases its conclusion that the net capital rule is the culprit. The Com-
mission mentions neither the number of securities firms affected by the
proposals nor the possible harmful consequences of the amendments.
The latter omission leads one to wonder whether such consequences
were weighed against the benefits of the specific form of investor
protection suggested.
Probably the most obvious implications of the proposed amendments
to the Commission net capital rule are the anti-competitive ones. Although
those ramifications are nowhere analyzed by the Commission, the long
range interests of "investor protection," in whose name the amendments
are being proposed, clearly require their consideration. A diminution of
competition will surely breed such harmftd side effects as higher broker-
age commissions," lower broker-dealer operating efficiency, decreased
availability of securities firms to effect small transactions, a decline in
quality and quantity of customer service and a reduction in innovations
in the broker-dealer industry.
There probably are large New York Stock Exchange member firms
that will fill small purchase orders. Yet it is common knowledge that
many of those firms try to discourage and avoid such transactions. 4 As
institutional domination of the market increases, there is reason to believe
that such orders will probably be discouraged even more.85 Therefore,
33. One may argue that the SEC, through the authority granted in § 19 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970), may prohibit higher com-
mission rates. But the recent negotiations that led to the commission surcharge and then
higher commissions on small transactions would lead one to think otherwise. This would
seem to be an area where, based on the record, the regulators are dominated by the
regulated.
34. For example, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a firm which built
its reputation and size on the philosophy of serving the small investor, will not generally
accept orders to sell securities (not purchased at Merrill Lynch) when those securities
are priced under three dollars per share. Similarly, purchase orders for low-priced stocks
are discouraged. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., COMPLIANCE
RuLEs & REGULATIONS (1971). In a discussion with the operations manager of a Merrill
Lynch branch office, the author was told that customers wishing to buy or sell low-
priced stock (below three dollars per share) are generally advised by Merrill Lynch
representatives to secure the brokerage services of a small securities firm.
35. There are two reasons usually offered by the large firms for not handling pur-
chase and sale orders for low-priced stocks: profit to the brokerage firm for executing
the transaction may be insufficient and problems could arise from executing purchase
orders for highly speculative low-priced stocks. It is not within the scope of this article
to analyze those reasons. But for our purposes it is important to note that if large
securities firms will not execute orders for speculative securities, perhaps the most im-
portant function of the small firm would be the handling of these securities; and if small
firms are driven out of business, the consequences with xespect to a market for specula-
tive securities could be severe. As that market becomes more restricted, new and un-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
if small securities firms are forced out of business, who will be left to
handle those transactions ?
There are related ramifications that could prove even more costly
to the public. For example, how will a decline in the number of small
securities firms affect the ability of relatively small manufacturing or
service businesses to raise capital through the public markets? The
small business attempting to raise public capital necessarily relies on the
investment banking services of small securities firms, since large New
York Stock Exchange members do not generally underwrite securities
offerings by speculative companies of firms lacking a strong earnings
history.8 In the long run, the most significant loss to society occasioned
by a reduction in the number of small securities firms may not be the
loss of the small securities firms themselves. Indeed, the more significant
loss may well be all the small businesses that could only be capitalized
with funds raised through the efforts of the small securities firm."
There are, therefore, two aspects of this problem that require
analysis: first, the extent to which the proposed amendments would
eliminate competition; and, second, the ramifications of the anti-com-
petitiveness brought about by the amendments. With respect to the
initial question, the Commission has on file records that indicate the
number of broker-dealers having net capital less than 25,000 dollars. "
A survey of these records in needed to determine the number of such
broker-dealers that could or would not meet the higher capital require-
ments. This computation, however, would be enlightening only with
respect to the number of existing brokerage firms that would be forced
to close their doors. With regard to firms that are not presently engaged
in the business and that will never enter the industry because of the
proposed higher net capital requirements, a precise measurement would
obviously be more difficult.
There is no, current published list of securities dealers that indicates
tested companies will have greater difficulty in raising capital through public offerings
of securities.
36. The large securities firms have minimum sales and earnings requirements that
are quite substantial (750,000 to one million dollars in earnings). The standards of a
regional house are also considerable, ranging from 400,000 to 500,000 dollars in net earn-
ings. See WHY, WHEN AND HOW TO Go PUBLIC 14 (G. Hutchison cd. 1970).
37. For a somewhat complementary discussion of possible loss of small businesses
as a result of blue sky merit regulation, see J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW
BusINEss PROMOTIONS 1-58 (1971).
38. Since that information is within the exclusive control of the Commission and of
persons authorized to view it by the Commission, any measurement of the effects of the
proposed rule would have to be done by the Commission or by persons whom the Com-
mission would make privy to such information.
238
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the number of firms with capital below 25,000 dollars."9  However,
based upon the large number of unfavorable comments to the Com-
mission's proposed amendments, there are apparently many such firms.
Of more than 100 comments received on the proposal, less than five
were favoarble. ° The reaction of one small broker typified the responses:
"Why don't we stop kidding around and put everyone out of the
securities business but Merrill Lynch."'41 Although that reaction perhaps
exaggerated the problem, many of the brokers commented that the
amendment, if passed, would compel them to go out of business. One
broker asserted that Merrill Lynch was organized with capital of 6,000
dollars, Allen Co. with 1,500 dollars, and E. W. Hutton with only
500 dollars of borrowed funds."' Another dealer pointed out that in
many instances the amount of capital mandated under the proposed
amendment could be substantially in excess of 25,000 dollars, since a
firm desiring to keep its capital in the form of securities would actually
need $35,714.20 worth of securities to cover the thirty per cent haircut
requirement under the Commission's method of computing net capital.48
There are other possible anti-competitive ramifications of the pro-
posed amendments that warrant comment. First, the full 25,000 dollar
minimum capital requirement would not be applicable to existing
securities dealers until twelve months after the amendment goes into
effect. Yet new firms just entering the industry would be required to
have the full 25,000 dollar minimum capital before they could commence
operations.45 Thus, existing firms, for the first twelve months after the
effectiveness of the rule, would have a competitive advantage over new
firms attempting to raise sufficient capital to enter the business. This
problem could be obviated, however, if the proposed amendment were
revised to take effect with respect to all securities firms at the same
time, providing it would become effective at some future date so as to
allow ample notice and opportunity for existing firms to raise capital to
meet the new standards without unduly disrupting their business opera-
tions.
Another problem arises in connection with the proposal that the
39. There are some limited statistics in the SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, supra note
15, at 169, but those statistics are now over nine years old. Presumably the study being
completed by the SEC under the mandate of the Securities Investor Protection Act will
provide more current information.
40. See BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., Sept. 22, 1971, at A-4 to A-5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9288 (Aug. 13, 1971).
45. Id.
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net capital ratio be lowered to eight-to-one for broker-dealers during
the first twelve months of their existence and raised to twenty-to-one
thereafter.46 Obviously that amendment, if adopted, would provide estab-
lished securities firms with a competitive advantage over newly established
firms during the first twelve months of the new firms' existence. Most
of the broker-dealers who commented on the proposed amendments
did not strenuously object to the eight-to-one ratio for new firms." But
this fact is readily explained since most of the comments on the pro-
posals came from existing small firms which would not be affected by
eight-to-one ratio but which would be affected by an increase in
minimum capital.48 The promoters of new firms that intend to register
as broker-dealers in the future are not organized and, therefore, cannot
voice objections to the proposals. There are probably many persons who
would be interested in becoming securities brokers in the future but who
do not presently know of the proposals. Therefore, there are ample reasons
why strong comment was not forthcoming against the eight-to-one ratio
proposal. Nonetheless, the discriminatory aspects of the proposal are
obvious and should at least be considered.
In addition to the anti-competitive ramifications discussed above,
there are other fundamental faults that may be found with the proposed
amendments. Although the proposals are intended to help combat the
kind of brokerage failures that occurred during the 1969-1970 period
and the attendant losses to customers of the insolvent securities dealers,4
there is no logical correlation between a high net capital requirement
and the ability of securities firms to meet their obligations without
difficulty, especially since the proposals are unrelated to the character
and volume of business done by individual firms.5" Efficiently managed
firms may be operated profitably, although they are funded with relatively
little capital. On the other hand, bad management can cause the rapid
demise of a firm having a large amount of capital, and there was
substantial evidence of the fact during the 1969-1970 period.5 As a
recent study suggested, there were many reasons for the brokerage
failures of 1969-70: mismanagement, inefficiency, overexpansion of
operations, fraud, irresponsible actions by principals, reduced volume of
46. Id.
47. See note 40 supra.
48. -Id.
49. See note 44 supra.
50. Several small brokers commented that the amendments to the net capital rule
should be drafted in terms of the character and volume of business of securities firms.
See note 40 spra.
51. See note 1 supra.
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trading and substantial decline in stock prices.52 An increase in net
capital will obviously increase a securities dealer's commitment to his
firm; however, there is no basis to believe that such an increase will
improve either a firm's efficiency or a broker's ability to forecast market
trends. In that connection, many firms with substantial capital (far in
excess of the proposed 25,000 dollars) went under during 1969-1970.8
The proposed amendments are announced for the purpose of pro-
tecting the customers of small securities firms, which are basically
broker-dealers with capital of less than 25,000 dollars. However, the
irony of the Commission's proposal is that the number of firms with
capital well in excess of 25,000 dollars that failed in 1969-1970 may be
far greater than the number of smaller firms."' If that is true, then the
total amount lost by customers of large firms was greater than the
amount lost by customers of small firms during the period. The proposed
regulation, however, is aimed solely at the smallest firms. Although
the amendments would perhaps serve as some protection for the customers
of a few small firms if a correlation between higher net capital and
brokerage solvency is conceded, they would force other small firms
either to raise additional capital that may be greater than their require-
ments or to close their doors. However, the large firms that are under-
capitalized or inefficiently managed would be unaffected by the amend-
ments, except that some competition from smaller firms would be
eliminated. One would think that a more desirable goal would be to
maximize competition in the hopes of causing all firms to behave more
efficiently. Clearly the proposals are not designed to accomplish that
objective. The proposed amendments to the net capital rule thus conform
to a general theme of government regulation; namely, that regulation
adopted in the name of a desirable public purpose will inevitably cause
effects that were originally unannounced and that may be costly to the
public.5
5
52. Id.
53. See note 5 supra.
54. In a telephone conversation of November 30, 1971, with Mr. Ray Cocchi, Presi-
dent of the Independent Broker Dealers Trade Association, the author was advised that
Mr. Cocchi's estimates indicated that the total number of dollars lost by customers of
large firms was far greater than that lost by customers of small firms during 1969-70.
There are no published statistics that can be cited with respect to this matter. However,
that information is within the possession of the SEC and, it is submitted, such an analy-
sis should be made and published by the SEC before the proposed amendments are
adopted.
55. Such consequences have stemmed from the regulation of such matters as meat
inspection, food and drug manufacture, railroads and the promotion of new businesses.
See A. ALcinAx & W. ALLEN, UNlVaslTY EcoNomics 190-95 (1967) ; M. FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 129 (1962); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATIOIN, 1877-
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As previously indicated, the purpose of the proposed amendments
to the Commission net capital rule is to provide greater safety for the
cash and securities of customers that are in the possession of broker-
dealers." During 1969-1970, many customers permitted substantial
amounts of their cash and securities to remain in the possession of their
broker-dealers who, in turn, used those assets to help finance their
brokerage activities. There was no general rule requiring segregation of
customers' cash and securities and similarly there was no general require-
ment that a reserve be maintained by broker-dealers for the benefit of
their customers.57 When the securities firms failed, much of those
assests were lost to their rightful owners. It was in recognition of those
losses that the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970"s was enacted.
The 1970 Act created a nonprofit, federally chartered membership
corporation, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, the SIPC,
to provide insurance protection for the customers of both exchange
members and over-the-counter broker-dealers. 9  Generally speaking,
members of the SIPC automatically include all broker-dealers registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 193460 and all members of
nationl securities exchanges. In the event of liquidation of a member
firm, the SIPC will pay up to 50,000 dollars per customer account, except
that cash protection is limited to 20,000 dollars per customer account. 6
SIPC members are assessed amounts based on their volume of business
to fund the insurance protection. In the event those contributions by
members prove inadequate, standby authority is granted the SIPC to
borrow up to one billion dollars from the United States Treasury. 2
Even though the Securities Investor Protection Act was greeted
generally with much fanfare, it is appropriate to note that there is
evidence that the SIPC came into being after the industry had initiated
its own solutions. 8 Although the Act is now law and the SIPC does
insure customer accounds to the extent of the amounts indicated, it
1916, at 26 passim (1965) ; G. KOLxo, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 57 passim
(1963); E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY passim (1966);
J. MoFsxy, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PRO-MOTIONS 1-3 passim (1971).
56. See note 44 supra.
57. For a discussion of the safeguards that existed for the protection of broker-
dealer customers at the time of the 1969-70 brokerage failures, see Sowards & Mofsky,
supra note 4, at 1271.
58. See note 7 supra.
59. See note 57 supra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1970).
61. See note 57 sutra.
62. Id.
63. See Barron's, Dec. 28, 1970, at 7, col. 1.
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would be a mistake, as a congressional study indicated, to consider the
SIPC a panacea for the customers of securities firms.64 It has been noted
that the legislative history of the SIPC did not develop an accurate
estimation of anticipated losses arising from the liquidation of securities
firms in the future. 5 Financial information regarding broker-dealers
obtained through the use of questionnaires, "early warning systems""
and other techniques provided information that, although accurate when
prepared, may not correctly reflect the current conditions of some
dealers. Since there is little basis upon which to compute the future
number of brokerage liquidations that will be administered by the
SIPC,1 7 there is no way of knowing whether present assessments from
SIPC members will be adequate in the event of future crises. Therefore,
higher future assessments to the extent permitted by the statute, are
not impossible." Moreover, it would not be surprising to find those
costs being passed on to customers of securities firms in the form of
higher commissions.
One of the principal objectives of the 1970 Act was to provide
authority for the Commission to adopt rules that would result in
strengthening the financial responsibility of broker-dealers. Prior to the
1970 Act, regulation of financial responsbility was accomplished on a
fragmentary basis. 9 In particular, the Commission's authority to adopt
rules with respect to such matters as free credit balances and segregation
of customers' securities was uncertain."' A primary aim of the 1970
64. For example, a customer who is unable to obtain his stock certificate with-
in a reasonable period of time forfeits the privilege of being in a position to
trade the security in order to realize a profit or prevent further losses. He also
fofeits the privilege of using his security as collateral for another business ven-
ture.
BNA SEc. REG. L. REP., July 28, 1971, at E-2. In addition to other matters, the Se-
curities Investor Protection Act of 1970 does not protect against those situations.
65. See note 1 supra.
66. When a broker-dealer's net capital falls below the minimum requisite amount
or when its books and records are not current, it must give immediate telegraphic notice
to the SEC and to the self-regulatory organization to which it belongs. Additionally,
when a broker-dealer's aggregate indebtedness is greater than 1200 per cent of its net capi-
tal, certain prescribed reports must be filed with regulatory agencies. See SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 9268 (July 30, 1971).
67. In the event of a failure of an SIPC member, the 1970 Act provides for the
liquidation of that member by the SIPC. See note 57 supra.
68. For a description of amount and manner of assessments for members of the
SIPC, see Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 4.
69. For a description of the manner in which that regulation was accomplished,
see id. at 1272-77.
70. See Hearings on H.R. 13308 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Comnerce and Finance, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 211, 353, 366 (1970).
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Act to clarify the Commission's position in that respect. Therefore,
§ 15(c) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to
specifically delegate broad rule-making authority to the Commission
Nwth respect to custody and use of customers' securities and the
carrying and use of customers' deposits or credit balances."' Under that
authority, the Commission recently proposed the adoption of new rules
that are intended to deal with those matters.7 If adopted, these rules
would seem to obviate any need to up-grade the net capital requirements.
These rules, however, are sure to have some adverse economic con-
sequences, some of which have already been recognized by the Com-
mission."
The proposed rules would: (a) severely restrict broker-dealer use
of customer cash; (b) impose cash liabilities on firms that misplace or
fail to receive from other dealers securities that are bought and paid
for by customers; and, (c) provide for the lending and hypothecation
rules that are currently required by the self-regulatory organizations.
With respect to (a) and (b), the rules are being proposed pursuant to
the authority granted the Commission under the financial responsibility
provisions"4 of the Exchange Act, while the lending and hypothecation
provisions are being proposed pursuant to the Exchange Act sections
granting the Commission power to promulgate rules regulating borrowing
by brokers and dealers."
Proposed rule 15(c) (3)-3 would require broker-dealers to maintain
a "Special Account for the Exchange Benefit of Customers" in the
nature of a trust fund through which broker-dealers would be required
to effect transactions of cash left in their possession. Withdrawals
71. No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce
or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an ex-
empted security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills)
[otherwise than on a national securities exchange] in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Comnission shall prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to provide safe-
guards with respect to the financial responsibility and related practices of
brokers and dealers including, but not limited to, the acceptance of custody and
use of customers' securities, and the carrying and use of customers' deposits
or credit balances. Such rules and regulations shall require the maintenance of
reserves with respect to customers' deposits or credit balances, as determined by
such rules and regulations. (Existing law that was omitted is enclosed in
brackets; new material is in italics.)
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (3) (1970).
72. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9388 (Nov. 8, 1971).
73. Id.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 8(c), 15; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78h(c),o (1970).
76. See note 72 supra.
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from the Special Account could be made for limited purposes only;
including settlements of transactions, payments of obligations to cus-
tomers, reimbursement to broker-dealers for certain obligations owned
them by customers and secured margin loans. Securities firms, however,
would be generally prohibited from using customers' cash for non-
customer related purposes. In other words, broker-dealers would be
barred from financing their firms' transactions with the funds of their
customers." The rule also provides for a "Cash Reserve Bank Account"
to hold the excess of cash accountabilifies of broker-dealers to customers
over specified accountabilities of customers to broker-dealers."
With respect to brokerage custody of customers' securities, proposed
rule 15(c) (3)-4 would require broker-dealers to obtain possession of
and segregate fully paid and excess margin securities held for the
accounts of customers.7" In the event of a broker-dealer's inability to
reduce the securities to physical possession, he would be required to make
and maintain in a "Securities Reserve Bank Account" a desposit of an
amount equal to the value to such securities. Withdrawals from that
account could be made only to the extent that securities are in fact
reduced to physical possession or control. If a broker purchases securities
for a customer from another securities firm and the other firm fails to
deliver within the prescribed time period, the purchasing broker would
be required to make a deposit in the Securities Reserve Bank Account
within five business days after the settlement date.8" In the meantime,
funds paid by the customer for the purchased securities would be held in
the Special Account required by the provisions of proposed rule
15(c) (3)-3.
In addition to the requirement of the reserve account for fully
paid and excess margin securities, proposed rule 15(c)(3)-4 has a
mandatory buy-in provision after the expiration of a specified period of
time. That provision is intended to interact with recently adopted
rule 17(a)-13 that requires a quarterly box count verification of all
securities not in a broker-dealer's physical possession." If at the time
of quarterly box count there is a findng that securities should be, but are
not, in the possession of the brokerage firm, the broker must purchase
those securities and reduce them t6 possession within thirty days. 2
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. For a detailed description of the quarterly box-count requirements, see SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 9376 (Nov. 8, 1971).
82. See note 72 sitpra.
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The final area of brokerage customer protection where changes
have been proposed is in connection with the hypothecation rule. The
effect of the proposed amendments, which are comparable to New York
Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers Inc.
standards,83 would be to prohibit broker-dealers from borrowing for
themselves or lending to third persons their customers' securities. This
prohibition is operative unless the brokers first obtain for fair considera-
tion the customer's written authorization designating the particular
securities to be loaned or borrowed and specifying the terms and con-
ditions under which they may be loaned or borrowed.84 Furthermore,
the proposed amendments would preclude broker-dealers from lending
or hypothecating more securities carried for a customer's account than
is "fair" and "reasonable" in light of the customer's indebtedness with
respect to those securities.85
The express purpose behind the proposed rules restricting broker-
dealer use of customer cash, requiring segregation of customers' securities
and limiting the hypothecation activities of broker-dealers is "to afford
as complete protection as possible to customers . . .without depriving
the industry of necessary and legitimate means to carry on customer
oriented business.'8 Although the proposed rules would, if adopted,
obviously provide more protection than is presently afforded, there are
implications of those rules that should be closely scrutinized. It has
been estimated that from 260 to 400 million dollars of customers' cash
has been used in recent years by New York Stock Exchange member
firms in ways that would be prohibited under the new proposals.87 If
the practice of using customers' cash for broker-dealers' own business
activities were to be banned, enormous amounts of capital would have
to be raised from other sources. Securities firms might be forced to pay
interest or dividends on capital raised from non-customer sources, where-
as interest is not as a general rule currently paid on customers' cash. One
83. See NYSE rule 402; NASD Manual, art. III, § 19.
84. See note 72 supi-a.
85. For the purpose of this rule, any such lending or hypothecation shall be
deemed to be unreasonable if the market value of the securities in any general or
special account carried for a customer, in the case of hypothecation, exceeds
140% of the debit balance in such account, and, in the case of lending, exceeds
100% of the debit balance in such account; and, if such securities are hypothe-
cated in part and loaned in part, the aggregate market value of all such se-
curities shall not in combination exceed 140% of the part hypothecated and
100% of the part loaned.
Id.
86. Id.
87. See BusiNEss WEEK, Nov. 13, 1971, at 41.
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may even contemplate the possibility of some firms being forced out of
business because of their inability to raise requisite capital in time to
comply with the rules. In that connection, Commission officials have
admitted that some firms will have considerable difficulty in meeting
the requirements of the rules.8
Prior to the release of the proposed rules dealing with broker-
dealer use of customers' cash and securites, the SEC's Divsion of
Trading and Markets proposed reserve and segregation requirements
that would result in virtually no risk of loss with respect to customers'
funds and securities.89 Perhaps this is what some Congressmen had in
mind when the Securities Investor Act of 1970 was enacted." But as
the Commission's Office of Policy Research indicated in a recent study,
the establishment of a 100 per cent reserve requirement with respect
to customers' funds and securities could have severe repercussions on
the broker-dealer industry." The study concludes that broker-dealers
could create a fifteen per cent reserve for customers' cash without too
much difficulty, but as the reserve level nears 100 per cent, the adverse
effects on the income and financial structures of broker-dealers would
be very significant. Zero risk of loss has always proved too costly.
The Office of Policy Research study stated that if the new reserve
and segregation rules were to be adopted:
The net capital rule no longer [would have to] bear the
extremely heavy burden which it now carries, and market
forces, by limiting the supply of capital availabe to brokerage
firms and the kind of capital available to brokerage firms,
would help maintain the financial responsibility of firms.92
Thus, the principal function of the net capital rule would be to protect
securities firms from each other and to protect broker-dealer creditors
from losses due to brokerage failures. Since the proposed amendments
to the net capital rule are primarily intended to protect brokerage
customers with respect to cash and securities in the possession of
securities dealers, 3 those amendments would no longer appear necessary
if the reserve and segregation proposals were adopted. Yet both sets
of proposals remain open and the Commission has not proposed them as
alternatives. If the Commission insists on adopting the segregation and
88. Id.
89. See BNA SEc. REG. L. REP., Sept. 1, 1971, at A-1 to A-2.
90. Id.; Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 4, at 1286.
91. See note 89 supra.
92. BNA SEc. REG. L. REP., Sept. 1, 1971, at A-2.
93. See note 44 sukra.
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reserve requirements, at least it should refrain from contributing to
additional concentration in the brokerage industry by adopting the
proposed amendments to the net capital rule, especially when the segrega-
tion and reserve requirements would obviate the primary reasons for the
net capital rule amendments.
The proposed reserve and segregation rules would provide standards
that are so vastly different from current industry practices that, as the
Commission has noted, they would probably require significant restructur-
ing of broker-dealer operations. 4 Those brokerage firms that are unable
to comply with the new standards would be driven out of business and,
therefore, the proposed rules, like the proposed amendments to the net
capital rule, are sure to have anti-competitive effects. Whether the pro-
tections afforded by the various proposed rules discussed in this article
are a more desirable social alternative than the benefits resulting from
more competition in the broker-dealer industry is a question beyond the
scope of this paper. Moreover, we cannot know on an a priori basis
whether the protection to brokerage customers implicit in such regula-
tion will exceed the loss occasioned by the possible effects of decreased
competition. We can, however, recognize that there are certain to be
social welfare costs and it cannot be assumed that those costs will be less
than the benefits to be derived from the proposed regulation. In fact,
economic theory leads us to conclude precisely the opposite.
94. See note 72 supra.
